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FUENTES v. SHEVIN:
THE NEW YORK CREDITOR AND REPLEVIN
WILLiAM H. GARDN:ER*
INTRODUCriON
t is a commonplace that replevin, and its out-of-court equivalent,
self-help repossession, have become critical creditor remedies.1 Orig-
inated in the repetitive struggle over contested property rights, they
have achieved primary significance in the credit context as twentieth
century financing developments have increasingly concentrated on lien
and security interest devices over personal property-ranging from the
financing of the kitchen stove or family automobile to complex indus-
trial equipment.2 The Uniform Commercial Code, with its secured
lending provisions, is only one of the more recent innovations designed
to provide security to the creditor with possession of movable collateral
remaining in the borrower. As adopted by New York State, the Code
allows the secured creditor to employ self-help repossession or statutory
replevin to recover possession of the chattel upon the debtor's default.3
Section 7102 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules details the statutory
requirements for replevin.
* Member, New York Bar. B.A., The College of Wooster, 1953; LL.B., University
of Buffalo, 1959.
1. The word "replevin" no longer appears in the New York statutes. The action is
referred to as an action for the recovery of a chattel, and the prejudgment remedy is
referred to as "seizure." N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw art. 71 (McKinney Supp. 1972). The
common law term, still widely used by the New York bar, is used throughout this article.
It should be noted at the outset that the technical distinction between "replevin"
(the procedure for prejudgment seizure as an incident to the underlying action) and
the "action to recover a chattel" (the underlying action itself) is recognized. See Advisory
Committee Notes in 14 N.Y. STD. Crv. Pa Ac. SaRv. 336 (1964). The distinction in
language serves no useful purpose in the present context, however. "Replevin" is there-
fore used interchangeably in the article to refer either to the incidental prejudgment
relief or to the underlying action, as appropriate in the context in which it is used.
The question of the legality of self-help repossession is not dealt with herein. To
the effect that this remedy is unconstitutional, see Adams v. Egley, 338 F. Supp. 614
(S.D. Cal. 1972). Contra, Oller v. Bank of America, 342 F. Supp. 21 (N.D. Cal. 1972);
McCormick v. First Nat'l. Bank, 322 F. Supp. 604 (S.D. Fla. 1971). To the effect
that provisions in form contracts authorizing private repossession in a dwelling are un-
conscionable under section 2-302 of the Uniform Commerical Code, see Kosches v.
Nichols, 68 Misc. 2d 795, 797, 327 N.Y.S.2d 968, 970 (Civ. Ct. 1971).
2. See N.Y. U.C.C. §§ 9-503, -504 (McKinney 1964). The replevin remedy is not,
of course, limited to credit situations; it applies to any contest of property rights in
specific personal property. The discussion in this article is limited to its use in the
credit context, however.
3. N.Y. U.C.C. §§ 9-503, -504 (McKinney 1964).
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In its decision in Fuentes v. Shevin,4 the Supreme Court decisively
limited the powers of creditors to effect repossession through statutory
replevin. The decision specifically dealt with the constitutionality of
the Florida and Pennsylvania replevin statutes, holding them unconsti-
tutional to the extent that they permitted the prejudgment seizure of
property without advance notice and opportunity to be heard. How-
ever, the impact of the decision goes far beyond the states of Florida
and Pennsylvania. It directly affects the replevin statutes of virtually
every state-including New York. Although the case arose out of vari-
ous situations involving household items and persons of less pecunious
financial circumstances, the majority rejected the distinction posited
by other courts5 which would have made the due process requirements
of notice and hearing applicable only where necessities of living were
involved. The result is a clear, narrow (as the Court suggests") but
sweeping rule: notice and hearing will be required in virtually all
cases of prejudgment seizure of property. Procedural due process be-
comes the key, without regard to the value of the property, the cer-
tainty of plaintiff's right to recover possession, or the nature of the par-
ties to the transaction.
The Fuentes decision failed to finally resolve certain problems
which are inherent in the new procedural requirements: (1) the form
and extent of the hearing which will be required to meet due process
standards, (2) the extent to which prior notice and hearing may be
waived by the contracting parties, and (3) what circumstances will
justify avoidance of the requirement of prior notice and hearing. The
cases suggest tentative answers to these questions, and legislative amend-
ments fostered by the decision may clarify some of the areas. But the
creditor's attorney is immediately faced with the need to advise creditor
clients as to a proper course to be followed in the extension of credit
in reliance upon-and subsequently proceeding to realize upon-per-
sonalty liens and security interests. This article attempts to chart the
course which should be pursued and to highlight changes in chattel
recovery remedies appropriate in light of the Fuentes ruling.
4. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
5. See, e.g., Brunswick Corp. v. J&P, Inc., 424 F.2d 100, 105 (10th Cir. 1970);
Epps v. Cortese, 326 F. Supp. 127, 136 (E.D. Pa. 1971); Fuentes v. Faircloth, 317 F.
Supp. 954, 957-58 (S.D. Fla. 1970). But see Laprease v. Raymnours Furniture Co., 315 F.
Supp. 716, 722-23 (N.D.N.Y. 1970).
6. 407 U.S. at 96.
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I. THE Fuentes DECISION
A brief review of the facts of the case and the reasoning of the Court
will be helpful to an understanding of the impact of Fuentes. The case
involved appeals by debtors in Florida and Pennsylvania. The Florida
appellant, Margarita Fuentes, purchased a gas stove and service policy
from Firestone Tire and Rubber Company under a conditional sales
contract. Subsequently, she purchased a stereophonic phonograph from
the same company under the same type of contract. With approximately
two-thirds of the contract amount paid, a dispute developed regarding
servicing of the stove. Mrs. Fuentes refused further payments and
Firestone instituted the claim for replevin in the Florida court. To
effect immediate seizure, Firestone was required to complete blanks on
an appropriate form and post a bond of twice the stated value of the
goods to be seized. In reliance upon these documents, the clerk of the
court issued a writ of replevin, and the stove and stereo were seized
by the sheriff. Mrs. Fuentes, under the guidance of a Legal Aid Office,
instituted the federal action for an injunction.7 A three-judge court
upheld the constitutionality of the Florida statute,8 and the appeal
followed.
The Pennsylvanian appellants presented similar facts. Personal
property-consisting of a bed, table, and other household goods--was in-
volved in each instance. Seizure was obtained by writs of replevin, with
all but one of the writs having been issued in connection with a debtor-
creditor relationship with outstanding installment sale contracts simi-
lar to that of Mrs. Fuentes.9 Like the Florida court, the Pennsylvania
court upheld the constitutionality of the replevin statute.1 0
Both the Florida and Pennsylvania statutes permitted ex parte
applications and provided for the posting by the applicant of a bond
for twice the value of the property to be seized. No opportunity for a
prior hearing or for notice prior to the seizure was provided. Any
7. For an interesting recital of the facts and strategy used in the presentation of
the Fuentes claims to the federal courts, see Abbott & Peters, Fuentes v. Shevin: A
Narrative of Federal Test Litigation in the Legal Services Program, 4 IowA L. Rlv.
955 (1972).
8. Fuentes v. Faircloth, 317 F. Supp. 954 (S.D. Fla. 1970).
9. One of the appellants from the Pennsylvania court was a deputy sheriff who
obtained replevin process to recover his son's toys from the home of his former wife
in connection with a custody dispute. As previously noted (supra note 2), replevin is
available in any instance where the possession of personal property is at issue, not
merely when the rights of secured creditors and debtors are at stake.
10. Epps v. Cortese, 326 F. Supp. 127, 136 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
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judicial determination of the rights of the parties on the merits had
to be made in proceedings subsequent to the seizure."
The Court first noted that the prejudgment replevin statutes de-
scended from the common law replevin action, which originated six
centuries ago.' 2 At that time, however, replevin would lie only in situa-
tions where specific goods had been "wrongfully taken or 'distrained,' "
whereas a claimant to property who alleged merely that it was being
wrongfully withheld from his possession by another person was limited
to the action of detinue. There, under English law, no provision was
made for the prejudgment seizure of the property. Moreover, where
the common law did allow prejudgment seizure by the state, notice
and an opportunity to be heard was required. Through the years, the
efficacious nature of the replevin writ resulted in the expansion of its
use to encompass both the wrongful withholding and the wrongful
taking of property. The result, in the twentieth century, has been the
widespread use of the writ in the secured credit field to obtain repos-
session after the occurrence of default gives the secured creditor the
immediate right to possess the collateral.
The Court viewed the primary question in the case as being
whether the state statutes, which rested on the right of hearing after
seizure, satisfied procedural due process requirements under the four-
teenth amendment by providing hearings "at a meaningful time" or,
alternatively, whether such hearings were required before agents of
the state were permitted to actually seize possession of the property." In
the view of the majority, any meaningful legal right to notice and
hearing "must be granted at a time when the deprivation can still be
prevented."' 4 Where goods are seized before notice or hearing, and
the debtor's right to the goods is subsequently established, the goods
may be returned. However, "no later hearing and no damage award
can undo the fact that the arbitrary taking ... has already occurred."' 1
The Court had no difficulty in finding that a property interest falling
within the fourteenth amendment's protection was involved, even
11. Florida law required the commencement and subsequent prosecution of the
replevin action to final judgment. Under Pennsylvania law, replevin seizure was avail.
able without the necessity of commencing a formal action. If the rights of the parties
were to be litigated, subsequent suit had to be commenced by the party from whose
possession the goods had been seized. 407 U.S. at 73-78.
12. Id. at 78.
13. Id. at 80.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 82.
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if it were assumed that, on the merits, the plaintiff-creditor was en-
titled to immediate possession. The issue decided by the Court was
framed in terms of the "temporary non-final deprivation of property,"' 6
which would occur in all ex parte replevins where the use of the prop-
erty was denied to the true owner between the date of seizure and the
date when he might recover it or damages in a subsequent hearing.
Moreover, the provision (found in the Florida and Pennsylvania
statutes and in the New York legislation 17) whereby a defendant might
reclaim his property pending final judgment by posting a bond,
necessitated the loss of one item of property (the bond premium) for
the recovery of another. In any view, the loss of the use of the collateral
involved a significant taking of property so as to come within the
Due Process Clause. 8
The Court rejected the "necessities of life" limitation applied by
certain of the lower courts in connection with replevin. Procedural due
process would require prior notice and opportunity to be heard in all
but "extraordinary situations."'19 Although there might be cases "in
which a creditor could make a showing of immediate danger that a
debtor [would] destroy or conceal disputed goods . . . [the Florida
and Pennsylvania statutes were] not 'narrowly drawn to meet such
unusual condition.' "20
The decision was rendered by a four to three margin, with Justices
Powell and Rehnquist not participating. Speaking for the dissent,
Justice White urged that the insistence that the seller of property appear
at a hearing to establish that there is "reasonable basis for his claim of
default" was not constitutionally required.2' The occurrence of de-
fault is not generally an issue of dispute, nor is "the likelihood of a
mistaken claim of default . . .sufficiently real or recurring to justify
a broad constitutional requirement" going beyond the existing state
law.22 Noting the provisions in section 9-503 of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code for repossession by secured creditors and the likely increase
in expense and delay imposed by the new procedure, the dissenting
justices would have upheld the lower courts' decisions.
16. Id. at 85.
17. See N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 7103 (McKinney Supp. 1972).
18. 407 U.S. at 86-90.
19. Id. at 90-91.
20. Id. at 93, quoting from Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337,
339 (1969).
21. 407 U.S. at 99-100.
22. Id.
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II. THE LAW PRIOR TO Fuentes
A. Pre-Laprease
The decision in Fuentes was anticipated by the three-judge district
court decision of Laprease v. Raymours Furniture Co.28 Prior to that
decision, no serious question had been raised to the constitutionality of
the New York replevin procedure. Grounded in antiquity, the require-
ment for the posting of bond protection and the defendant's opportu-
nity for a post-seizure hearing gave the appearance of the essential fair-
ness appropriate to due process of law.
The revision of New York's procedural law in 1963 left the law
of replevin substantially unchanged. 4 The replevin action codified un-
der article 71 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules was applicable to
any situation where "the right to possession of a chattel" was in issue.25
The action was commenced by summons and complaint, and, as in any
other action, it would conclude in final judgment.26 Available here,
however, was the further opportunity to the plaintiff to obtain prompt
possession of the chattel, provided only that the plaintiff's attorney pre-
sented to the sheriff the summons and complaint (if not previously
served), a satisfactory undertaking amounting to double the value of
the chattels to be seized (as claimed or estimated by plaintiff), an affi-
davit (1) identifying the chattels to be seized, (2) showing that plain-
tiff was entitled to possession by virtue of facts stated, (3) indicating
that the chattel was "wrongfully held" by the defendant in the action,
(4) stating the value of the chattel and (5) setting forth the status of
the action, and, finally, a requisition, consisting simply of the written
direction of plaintiff's attorney instructing the sheriff to seize the
chattels. 27 The last named instrument was "deemed the mandate of the
court."
28
On the strength of these papers and without any application having
been made to the court or any prior process having been served on the
23. 315 F. Supp. 716 (N.D.N.Y. 1970).
24. The Advisory Committee characterized article 71 of the CPLR as a "simpli-
fication" of previous provisions regulating the replevin action and the prejudgment
replevin seizure remedy. See the Advisory Committee Notes in 14 N.Y. STD. Civ. Pac.
SERv. 336 (1964).
25. N.Y. Oiv. PRAc. LAw § 7101 (McKinney Supp. 1972).
26. Id. §§ 7102(a), 7108.
27. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1962, ch. 308, § 7102. The text of article 71 (§§ 7101-12)
of that statute appears as an appendix to Laprease v. Raymours Furniture Co., 315 F.
Supp. 716, 725-28 (N.D.N.Y. 1970).
28. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1962, ch. 308, § 7102(d).
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defendant, the sheriff was required to summarily seize the property.29
If the chattel was located in a building or enclosure and was not de-
livered on demand, the sheriff was required to break, enter and seize the
items.80 Following seizure, he was to retain the property for three days
(unless a court directed otherwise), at the expiration of which period
it was delivered to the plaintiff, provided the defendant had not in the
interim reclaimed the property by serving a notice on the sheriff with
an undertaking in the same amount as that posted by the plaintiff or
served certain motion papers permitted by the article.31 Alternatively,
the court might impound the chattel before delivery to the plaintiff,
if it found that "the chattel [was] of such a nature, or the circumstances
[were] such, that the moving party, if found to be entitled to possession,
would not be adequately compensated for its loss by the payment of
its pecuniary value."-2
Being an action to try the right to possession of a chattel, replevin
could lie only where the defendant was in possession at the time of
service of the original process. 33 Provision was made for an award of
the value of the chattel if it was unavailable for delivery at the time
of trial.34 The sole remedy for plaintiff was delivery of the chattel at the
trial together with damages for wrongful detention or depreciation of the
property.35 Accordingly, the replevin feature-prejudgment seizure-
provided both an in rem type of remedy, subjecting the property to the
action pending personal service of the summons on the defendant, and
gave the plaintiff an opportunity for immediate possession of the chattel
at its current value rather than the less advantageous final remedy of
possession at a potentially reduced value and at some later date when
final judgment would have been rendered. If the prejudgment seizure
was not prevented by reclamation or court order, the ultimate relief
in the action-possession of the chattel-was vested in the plaintiff
before defendant's answer was due or, indeed, even before the action
had been commenced by service.36
29. Id. § 7102(a).
30. Id. '§ 7110.
31. Id. § 7102(f).
32. Id. § 7103(b).
33. Mahr v. Livingstone, 55 Misc. 133, 106 N.Y.S. 308, aff'd, 122 App. Div. 921,
107 N.Y.S. 1136 (lst Dep't. 1907).
34. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1962, cl. 308, § 7108.
35. Id.; Allen v. Fox, 51 N.Y. 562 (1873).
36. Frequently, the creditor-plaintiff, having obtained the chattel following the
three-day holding period (N.Y. Sess. Laws 1962, ch. 308, § 7102(f)) would abandon
further litigation, unless an answer to the complaint were served. Finkenberg Furniture
23
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The secure legal position of the replevin procedure came into ques-
tion following the Supreme Court's landmark decision in Sniadach v.
Family Finance Corp.37 There, the Court struck down Wisconsin's
prejudgment garnishment law, under which a plaintiff's attorney might
initiate the summary process whereby fifty per cent of a defendant's
wages were garnished to secure a fund out of which any future judg-
ment in a pending action might be paid. Justice Douglas, writing the
majority opinion, emphasized (1) the special character of wages and
(2) the extremely harmful effect on the wage earner of their seizure
without an opportunity to be heard prior to ultimate trial.8s Justice
Harlan, concurring, was more emphatic on the fundamental due
process considerations:
From my standpoint, I do not consider that the requirements of
"notice" and "hearing" are satisfied by the fact that the petitioner
was advised of the garnishment simultaneously with the garnishee, or
by the fact that she will not permanently lose the garnished property
until after a plenary adverse adjudication of the underlying claim
against her, or by the fact that relief from the garnishment may have
been available in the interim under less than clear circumstances....
Apart from special situations... I think that due process is afforded
only by the kinds of "notice" and "hearing" which are aimed at estab-
lishing the validity, or at least the probable validity, of the underlying
claim against the alleged debtor before he can be deprived of his
property or its unrestricted use. I think that is the thrust of the past
cases in this Court.3 9
The Sniadach decision was reinforced by the Court's decision in
Goldberg v. Kelly40 the following year, holding that procedural due
process required a hearing before welfare payments could be termi-
nated, rather than just the post-termination hearing provided by law.
Sniadach and Goldberg became the impetus for constitutional chal-
lenges to summary prejudgment remedies across the country.41 The
Corp. v. Vasquez, 67 Misc. 2d 154, 155, 324 N.Y.S.2d 840, 843 (Civ. Ct. 1971).
Although the sheriff was required to serve the summons and complaint with the replevin
papers "on each defendant," he needed only to serve the affidavit, requisition and
undertaking "upon the person from whose possession the chattel is seized." N.Y. Sess.
Laws 1962, ch. 308, § 7102(b). Accordingly, seizure could precede the commencement
of the action in any instance where the property was not physically in the possession of
one of the defendants at the time of seizure.
37. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
38. Id. at 337-42.
39. Id. 343.
40. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
41. 407 U.S. at 72-73 n.5.
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first decision to deal directly with the replevin remedy was Bruns-
wick Corporation v. J&P, Inc.,42 decided by the Tenth Circuit in 1970.
The court denied the conditional vendee's contention that Bruns-
wick, in its summary replevin seizure of bowling equipment, had
caused the denial of the vendee's right to procedural due process. The
vendee admitted default on the contract and had agreed in the instru-
ment that upon default Brunswick might enter and repossess. Sniadach,
in the view of the Tenth Circuit, was a "unique case involving 'a spe-
cialized type of property presenting distinct problems in our economic
system.' "4 This factor distinguished it from the commercial case be-
fore the court.
B. Laprease v. Raymours Furniture Co.44
It was in this state of the law that the challenge to New York's
replevin statute was posed. Laprease, itself a consolidation of cases in-
volving separate replevin seizures, presented to the Northern District
Court in New York facts and contentions similar to those subsequently
placed before the Supreme Court in Fuentes. All of the plaintiffs were
persons of marginal economic vitality seeking injunctive relief against
impending seizures of household goods under the replevin process.
Mrs. Laprease alleged that she believed she had a meritorious defense
on the action and that she was on welfare and unable to make the re-
quired payments.4 5 Plaintiffs Lawson and Messler, on the other hand,
contended that they were entitled, by oral agreement with the re-
spective creditors, to make reduced payments following the initial de-
faults and to retain possession of the conditionally sold merchandise
while such payments continued to be made.46
The three-judge court was confronted with three contentions by
plaintiffs: (1) that prejudgment seizure deprived them of procedural
due process, (2) that the seizure constituted an unreasonable search and
seizure under the fourth amendment, as applicable to states through
the fourteenth, and (3) that the replevin statute denied them the
equal protection of the laws, due to their financial inability to take
advantage of the reclaiming provisions available to others of more
adequate financial means. 47
42. 424 F.2d 100 (10th Cir. 1970).
43. Id. at 105. The specalized property was wages.
'44. 315 F. Supp. 716 (N.D.N.Y. 1970).
45. Id. at 719.
46. Id. at 719-20.
47. Id. at 720.
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The court declined to rule on the equal protection argument, but
held for the plaintiffs with respect to both of their remaining conten-
tions. Noting that the search and seizure protection applies to civil as
well as criminal proceedings and that the warrantless search of a
private dwelling is presumptively unreasonable, the court found a vio-
lation of plaintiffs' fourth amendment rights. "If the Sheriff cannot
invade the privacy of a home without a warrant when the state interest
is to prevent crime, he should not be able to do so to retrieve a stove
or refrigerator about which the right to possession is disputed." 48 Par-
tially foreshadowing Fuentes, the three-judge court further held that the
plaintiffs had been deprived of their rights to procedural due process.
Because the goods sought to be repossessed were necessary household
goods, deprivation of which was equally as severe as the loss of wages
in Sniadach, the court held New York's statute unconstitutional. The
statute impermissibly allowed prejudgment seizure "without even an
ex parte order of a judge or court upon a showing of justification
therefor."49
The rule announced in Laprease was ambiguous, in that concepts
of search and seizure (with ex parte procedures available in criminal
cases) were interwoven with )iue process concepts. The question
whether prior notice to the debtor was generally necessary was not
clearly answered, although the answer was intimated. Moreover, the
case seemed to be limited to instances of consumer possessions of a
"necessary" nature.51 Laprease, in other words, apparently presented
a victory for consumer creditors, if the right kind of essential property
48. Id. at 722.
49. Id. at 725.
50. The court indicated that procedural due process required prior notice "or at
least that the creditor present to a judicial officer the circumstances allegedly justifying
the summary action." 315 F. Supp. at 724. The definite requirement of notice was also
indicated at page 722 of the decision. The court emphasized that the absence from the
statute of "even an ex parte application" requirement was indicative of the denial of
procedural due process and of fourth and fourteenth amendment rights. Id. at 723, 725.
However, the court failed to articulate clearly a difference in standards between the
constitutional rights at issue. (See text accompanying note 74 infra.) It was not certain
whether the practical result of the decision would be the giving of notice in most cases
or merely the submission of ex parte papers containing general allegations about the
risk to the property unless summary seizure was used.
51. On the issue of procedural due process, the court, following its interpretation
of Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969), rested its decision on the
character of the goods being seized (315 F. Supp. at 722-23) and disavowed any in-
tention to interfere with the replevin remedy "except as herein specifically provided."
Id. 725; cf. General Elec. Credit Corp. v. Pristone, 68 Misc. 2d 475, 479, 326 N.Y.S.
2d 898, 902 (Sup. Ct. 1971). Note, however, that the search and seizure argument
(315 F. Supp. at 721-22) was not so qualified and may not be so limited.
26
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was involved. But the result, if limited to the substitution of an ex
parte order process for the previous requisition "deemed the mandate
of the court,"' 52 had the potential for becoming a transformation more
of form than of substance.
C. The Legislative Response
In response to the uncertainties of Laprease, the 1971 Legislature
took refuge in the time-honored device of answering a question with
a question. The statute was amended to provide for an order of seizure,
in lieu of the previous attorney-issued requisition, "[u]pon presentation
of the affidavit and undertaking and upon such terms as may be re-
quired to conform to the due process of law requirements of the four-
teenth amendment to the constitution of the United States."153 In
lieu of the previous authority of the sheriff to break into a build-
ing or enclosure to seize the chattel if not delivered on his de-
mand,54 the amendment permitted the inclusion in the order of seizure
of authority to break into the premises, solely as a matter of judicial
discretion.15 To permit the defendant greater opportunity to reclaim,
the holding period was extended from three days to ten days56 and
special provisions were included for the return of the property to the
defendant without bond under limited circumstances. 57
Governor Rockefeller signed the legislation, while indicating
substantial disapproval of it. He simultaneously referred the entire
52. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1962, ch. 308, 17102 (d).
53. N.Y. Crv. PRAc. LAw § 7102(d) (McKinney Supp. 1972) (emphasis added).
54. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1962, ch. 308, § 7110(d).
55. N.Y. Civ. P c. LAw § 7102(d) (McKinney Supp. 1972).
56. Id. §§ 7102(f), 7103.
57. Id. § 7103(c):
1. If a chattel which is in the custody of the sheriff is personal property
which if owned by a defendant would be exempt from application to the satis-
faction of a money judgment, if the value of the possession of the chattel
to the defendant is greater than the value of its possession to the plaintiff,
if the interest of the plaintiff would not thereby be prejudiced and if the
interests of justice so require, upon motion of the defendant, upon notice
to the sheriff and to all parties to the action, and on such terms and on
such, security and conditions as to the court may seem proper, the court may
order its return to the defendant.
2. If the court orders the return of the chattel to the defendant, it shall
grant a restraining order that the chattel shall not be removed from the state
if it is a vehicle, aircraft or vessel or, otherwise, from its location, transferred,
sold, pledged, assigned or otherwise disposed of or permitted to become
subject to a security interest or lien until further order of the court. Unless
the court otherwise directs, the restraining order does not prohibit a disposition
of the chattel to the plaintiff. Disobedience of the order may be punished as
a contempt of court.
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question to the State Consumer Protection Board 8 for review and
preparation of final proposed legislation for presentation to the 1973
session of the Legislature.59
III. THE ImPAcT OF Fuentes ON
REPLEVIN IN NEW YORK STATE
A. Replevin Which Meets the Fuentes Requirements
Pending further legislation, the present statutory procedures create
expense and an opportunity for delay far beyond that necessary to assure
the constitutional protection of the delinquent debtor. This is particu-
larly true where repossession is sought of goods which have relatively
little value or were given as security for the recovery of a debt with a
relatively low balance.
1. Due process. To comply with the due process requirements,
the creditor may well find himself: (1) going to court to obtain an
order to show cause directing the debtor to appear and be heard if
he wishes; (2) arranging for satisfactory service within defined and
sometimes rigid time limits;60 (3) appearing on the return date with
counsel and witnesses, prepared to give testimony in case the debtor ap-
pears and objects; (4) having obtained an order on the return date,
arranging for seizure by the sheriff or marshal; (5) making subsequent
application for a further order authorizing the sheriff to force entry
if delivery was originally denied (perhaps through another order to
show cause and follow-up return date, if the local court deems this a
necessary requirement either of discretion or due process) ;61 and (6)
adjusting to the information subsequently received that after entry
had been forced, the goods were not found, or, if found, were in a
depreciated or valueless state. The creditor will also have incurred the
58. N.Y. ExEc. LAw § 550 (McKinney Supp. 1972).
59. Governor's Memo., N.Y. Sess. Law 1971, at 2640.
60. Section 7102(d) (1) of the CPLR now leaves it to the court to determine what
notice is appropriate to comply with "terms as may be required to conform to the due
process of law requirements of the fourteenth amendment .... ." One post-Laprease
decision imposed a requirement of service at least seven days before the return date.
Kosches v. Nichols, 68 Misc. 2d 795, 798, 327 N.Y.S.2d 968, 971 (Civ. Ct. 1971). In
another case, service was required not less than seven nor more than fourteen days
before the return date. Finkenburg Furniture Corp. v. Vasquez, 67 Misc. 2d 154; 162,
324 N.Y.S.2d 840, 850 (Civ. Ct. 1971).
61. No specific statutory standards exist at the present. See N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW§ 7102(d) (McKinney Supp. 1972). See also note 75 infra and the text accompanying
notes 68-75 infra.
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cost of purchasing the undertaking required by the statute, apparently
at the time of the original application before it is even known whether
the ultimate order of seizure will be granted.6 2
This would not necessarily exhaust the possibilities, of course.
Compelled testimony63 and contempt procedures64 may be required to
enforce the creditor's rights-with further requirements of service of
process and the expenditure of time and money. Long before this route
is exhausted, the creditor with a marginal collateral situation will
be discouraged from further pursuit, a result which may accord with
predominant conceptions of social policy but which might better be
achieved by affirmative limitations on the original granting and receipt
of collateral security. The certain result is a substantial increase in
cost, either through increased legal expenses, decreased recoveries or
both.
The above assumes the simple, uncontested case, with such re-
sistance as exists being presented at the scene of the proposed seizure.
At the "hearing" required by the Constitution, the Supreme Court
assumes the matter will generally be disposed of by the debtor's failure
to appear.65 Where appearance is made, however, it is not clear what
procedure or standard of proof is appropriate. The issue at the hearing
is the question of default on the underlying debt and the consequent
right of repossession. If the creditor has presented a prima facie case
in his moving papers, fairness would seem to be satisfied by requiring
the debtor to assume the burden of objecting with facts in affidavit form
before the matter is subjected to a formal hearing. The hearing would
be held at a subsequent date (unless the creditor is present with wit-
nesses, prepared to proceed). The "hearing" is not a second trial; its
62. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 7102(e) (McKinney Supp. 1972). The statute is not
clear. The 1971 amendment substituted the requirement for execution by a sufficient
surety "acceptable to the cour' for the prior requirement that it be "acceptable to
the sheriff." Under prior practice, all papers on the replevin were submitted simultane-
ously to the sheriff. Practice may vary according to the jurisdiction and the particular
judge as to whether the undertaking must now be presented with the motion for the
seizure order rather than subsequently after notice, hearing and indication by the court
that it will grant the same.
63. N.Y. Crv. PRAc. LAW § 7112 (McKinney Supp. 1972).
64. Certain injunction sections in article 71 of the CPLR applying to replevins
expressly provide for enforcement by contempt. See N.Y. CIv. PRAc. LAw §§ 7102(d),
7103(c), 7109(b) (McKinney Supp. 1972). But note the Advisory Committee Notes
on the original recommendation of the CPLR to the legislature in 14 N.Y. STD. Civ.
PRAc. SFRV. 411 (1964): "No provision for contempt for failure to deliver the chattel
to the sheriff before judgment is proposed."
65. 407 U.S. at 92-93 n.29.
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object is to determine the "validity or at least the probable validity"00
of the creditor's claim. The dissent in Fuentes refers to the issue as one
of "reasonable basis for [creditor's] claim of default." 67 This may repre-
sent a standard lower than that applied in criminal cases. However,
given the consumer consciousness of the times, it is doubtful that the
creditor will readily obtain prejudgment possession in any strongly con-
tested situation, despite the theoretically lower standard employed.
Allusion was made above to the possibility of a second applica-
tion to the court for permission to break, enter and seize on a replevin
attempt, the original order for which did not include such authority. 8
The possibility of this requirement exists because of the dual rationale
under the cases-that of unreasonable search and seizure on the
one hand and procedural due process on the other-coupled with
the absence of definitive statutory standards to govern the seizure
application.
2. The fourth amendment. The attack on summary replevin has
been pressed both on the procedural due process and the unlawful
search and seizure premises. Where Laprease upheld the attack on both
grounds, however, the Supreme Court in Fuentes adjudicated only on
the procedural due process argument. The Court expressly withheld
final judgment on the search and seizure point, noting that "once a
prior hearing is required, at which the applicant for a writ must estab-
lish the probable validity of his claim for repossession, the Fourth
Amendment problem may well be obviated."0 9 The question whether
satisfaction of the procedural due process standard would ipso facto
satisfy probable cause requirements for search and seizure was not
essential to the decision in Fuentes, however, and remains open for
future high court review.
Both Laprease and Blair v. Pitchess,70 the two pre-Fuentes lower
court cases which applied the procedural due process principle to dis-
allow summary replevin seizure, also held the statutes unconstitutional
on the alternative ground of unreasonable search and seizure. The
principle that the fourth amendment search and seizure requirements
apply to civil, as well as criminal, cases was made clear by the Supreme
66. Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 343 (1969). See also text
accompanying supra note 39.
67. 407 U.S. at 99-100.
68. See text accompanying supra note 61.
69. 407 U.S. at 96 n.32.
70. 5 Cal. 3d 258, 486 P.2d 1242, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1971).
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Court in Camara v. Municipal Court71 in 1967, upholding the right
of the homeowner to refuse access to civil inspectors in the absence
of a warrant. The case suggested, however, that the standards of de-
termination of probable cause in civil matters may well be more flexi-
ble than would be the case in a criminal situation, having cognizance of
the legitimate interests of the state in gaining access (there for hous-
ing inspections) and the degree of intrusion contemplated.72
The post-La prease amendment of the New York statute provided
that the creditor's original application, if it sought inclusion of author-
ity to the sheriff to break, enter and search, must include "facts
sufficient under the due process of law requirements ... to authorize
the inclusion in the order of such a provision. " Quaere, whether fourth
amendment search and seizure standards (applicable to the states
through the fourteenth amendment) would be met by the same show-
ing and notice necessary to comply with procedural due process (also
applicable under the fourteenth amendment, but involving fifth amend-
ment rights). Laprease made no ultimate distinction between the ef-
fectuation of the "probable cause" requirements of search and seizure
and the general requirements of procedural due process. Blair, on the
other hand, specifically held that a showing of probable cause was
necessary, including "probable cause to believe that the property is at
the location specified in the process." 74 This imports into the civil
replevin action the same requirement applicable in a criminal case.
The unqualified transfer of that requirement to a replevin action order
for breaking, entering, and seizing collateral would impose an undue
burden on the enforcement of contractual obligations7 5
71. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
72. Id. at 534-39.
73. N.Y. Crv. P Ac. LAw § 7102(d) (McKinney Supp. 1972).
74. 5 Cal. 3d at 274, 486 P.2d at 1253, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 53. Regarding the
standards as applied in criminal cases, see Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523,
535 (1967); People v. Marshall, 13 N.Y.2d 28, 34, 191 N.E.2d 798, 801, 241 N.Y.S.2d
417, 421-22 (1963).
75. The imposition of a duty on a creditor to attest to the present location of collat-
eral where information has not been currently provided by the debtor seems an unneces-
sarily burdensome impediment to the protection and recovery of the collateral. At the least,
this would make an application for authority to break, enter and seize in the original
application for the order of seizure, pending discovery by deposition under CPLR
section 7112, virtually impossible. The latter process, in turn, might be difficult or im-
possible, depending on the ability to make personal service on the defendant and the
latter's willingness to comply with any court direction to appear and submit to exami-
nation.
The question might be obviated, by the creation of a rebuttable statutory pre-
sumption that personal goods in which the debtor has conveyed a security interest are
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The requirement of notice and prior opportunity to be heard,
linked as it is with the proposed seizure of property, was not involved
in the routine housing inspection application contemplated by Camara.
Search and seizure requirements are consistent with ex parte applica-
tions, the universal procedure followed in criminal cases. Where antici-
pated seizure of property in civil proceedings requires prior notice,
the requirement of a separate, ex parte or notice application for
authority to break and enter does not increase the protection of the
replevin defendant, except by restricting the power of the sheriff or
marshal at the time of the first demand. Applying the standard of
"reasonableness" in Camara, the Supreme Court seemed to be concerned
with this, as it indicated that a warrant should normally issue in hous-
ing inspection cases "only after entry is refused ... or there is other
satisfactory reason for securing immediate entry." 76 The marginal na-
ture of this consideration, however, hardly outweighs the public in-
terest in efficient law administration.
Inasmuch as the sole issues in the prejudgment replevin hearing
are indebtedness and default by the defendant and the right to posses-
sion in the creditor, little more than a reasonable basis to believe that
the merchandise is at a particular location should be required for in-
clusion of the power to enter and search in the order.1 7 Different con-
siderations may obtain, however, if the property to be seized is in the
possession of a third party bailee of the defendant debtor. If the bailee
asserts no independent interest for possession in himself, the plaintiff
may elect not to name him as a defendant in the replevin action.78
Procedural due process would require notice to the owner of the
located at his current residence in the absence of affirmative information to the con-
trary. A further rebuttable statutory presumption would be appropriate to the effect that
goods to be seized are where the creditor claims them to be in his motion for a seizure
order if, following proper service, defendant fails to specify where the goods are located
or, if he has no knowledge of that fact, fails to provide complete information to the
extent of his knowledge. This should present no insurmountable constitutional difficulty,
inasmuch as the debtor is subject to examination as to the location of the collateral.
In any event, it is quite probable that the courts will not impose the same stringent
probable cause requirements as apply to criminal prosecutions. Cf. Camara v. Municipal
Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534-39 (1967). Contra, Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258, 486 P.2d
1242, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1971).
76. 387 U.S. at 539-40.
77. See discussion in supra note 75.
78. Note the distinction in section 7102(b) of the CPLR between the "person
from whose possession the chattel is seized" and "each defendant not in default." The
latter must be served with the summons and complaint; a non-party possessor of the
goods is only served with the remaining replevin papers.
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property, but such notice might not be necessary for the 'bailee. Authori-
zation of a search of the bailee's premises, however, would certainly
require compliance with probable cause standards. It would seem that
the "reasonableness" standards of Camara militate against the issuance
of authority to break, enter and search without a prior refusal by the
bailee to deliver under an order of seizure.7 9
Where the immediate possession is in the defendant debtor, how-
ever, inclusion in the due process notice of reference to the creditor's
application for authority to break into and search defendant's en-
closure to find the chattel, absent voluntary delivery or advice of
the location of the collateral elsewhere, should be sufficient. Suitable
limitation of the manner of the search could be required. The statute
offers no workable standards on this subject at the present time.
B. A Streamlined Approach Consistent With Fuentes'
The creditor's counsel will be necessarily interested, in proce-
dures, where available, to obviate the need for notice and hearing and
the costs in time and expense and risk of waste to the collateral which
they necessarily impose. Two potential avenues are available, although
their feasibility in the normal situation is limited: (1) excuse .from
the ordinary requirements of notice because of the existence of exigent
circumstances and (2) waiver.
1. Exigent circumstances. The defaulting debtor generally gives
little assurance to the secured creditor that he will preserve and main-
tain the collateral with the same degree of interest as when he as-
sumed that his continued possession was not subject to challenge.
Worse, the contemplation of imminent repossession may motivate de-
struction or secretion of the property, either out of malice or self-in-
terest. Fuentes does not assume that this will occur, however, and leaves
the proof of such risks in individual cases to the creditor.
Recognizing the possibility of "extraordinary situations" which
may justify the postponement of notice and opportunity of a hearing
until after preliminary relief, the Court notes that these must, neces-
sarily, "be truly unusual." 0 Outright seizure has been upheld by the
Supreme Court only where: (1) "an important governmental or gen-
eral public interest" was involved, (2) there was a "special need for
very prompt action," and (3) the individual initiating the seizure was
79. 387 U.S. at 539-40.
80. 407 U.S. at 90.
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a government official "responsible for determining, under the standards
of a narrowly drawn statute, that it was necessary and justified in the
particular instance."81 Whether, by these comments, the Court meant
to suggest that such relief would be inappropriate in the absence of a
statute detailing standards to be applied is conjectural. Clearly, factual
support for such an application must be precise and in evidentiary form.
Oral unsworn allegations or sworn statements of a conclusory and
vague nature will not suffice. The reported statement by a defendant of
his intent to go back to Puerto Rico, without indication of the date
of the statement or the supposed time when this will occur was held in-
sufficient.8 2 Conclusory allegations that "many of the chattels were
small and of considerable value" and that "some, if not all, of those
chattels could be removed by the defendant [and] that the larger items
were subject to possible damage by the defendant" would not pass.88
Moreover, an affidavit supplying exigent circumstances on "information
and belief lacked any probative force."814
The degree of procedural due process which must be afforded in
any given situation depends on the judicial weighing of the relative in-
terest of the government in expedited compliance with its writs, on the
one hand, and the need of the citizen for advance notice and opportu-
nity to be heard in the context of the matter at issue, on the other.
The result of this weighing process will determine the extent to which
the courts will impose prior notice requirements on governmental
procedures.8 5 While the Supreme Court, in Fuentes, has established the
general rule of notice and hearing in replevin cases, it may be antici-
pated that in future cases variable fact situations will be weighed against
the same competing interests to determine how the balance should
be struck in determining the degree of "exigent circumstances" neces-
sary to avoid the general rule's requirements.
The governmental interest in promoting readily accessible credit
resources is the prime justification for strengthened replevin rights
for the creditor. The interest of the possessor of the goods in their con-
tinued use is, in general, the dominant debtor's interest to be pro-
tected. At what point will the balance tip in favor of the creditor?
81. Id. at 91.
82. Finkenberg Furniture Corp. v. Vasquez, 67 Misc. 2d 154, 161-62, 324 N.Y.S.2d
840, 849 (Civ. Ct. 1971).
83. Cedar Rapids Eng'r. Co. v. Haenelt, 68 Misc. 2d 206, 207-08, 326 N.Y.S.2d
653, 655 (Sup. Ct. 1971), aff'd, 39 App. Div. 2d 275, 333 N.Y.S.2d 953 (3d Dep't 1972).
84. Id. at 210-11, 326 N.Y.S.2d at 658.
85. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262-63 (1970).
FUENTES v. SHEVIN
Instances cited by the Supreme Court 6 fall within the "truly unusual"
criteria mentioned in Fuentes: protection of the public from loss due
to dangerous food substances,87 failing banks,8 8 or suspect stock issu-
ances,"" and expeditious adoption of wartime price regulations,90 etc.
Significantly, the attachment of property of an out-of-state resident
without prior notice is permissible. 91 In the replevin context, recurrent
mention is made of protection from the absconding or destruction of
the property.9 2 Statutes have established special standards regarding
disposition of perishable goods, recognizing their special characteris-
tics.93 The full extent to which the exigent circumstances exception
may be available must await further case development. The framing
of appropriate statutory standards for such exceptions to the general due
process requirements would go far toward protecting legitimate creditor
interests.
2. Waiver. Waiver of prior notice could offer significant relief to the
creditor in cases involving substantial security interests. Such will be
the case primarily when the waiver is specifically drafted and negotiated
in a commercial context in contrast to the typical personal loan involv-
ing form documents prepared by the lender. The availability of the re-
lief will be diminished if the anticipated further amendment of the
statute imposes specific procedural requirements not subject to
waiver. The due process requirements of the Constitution will, of
course, permit waiver; but its availability is limited to very restricted
circumstances.
The respondents in Fuentes argued that the appellants who signed
conditional sales contracts waived their due process rights by contract
language permitting the seller, at its option, to take back the mer-
chandise in the event of default.9 4 The provisions were in the printed
form, in small type, and without explanation of their meaning. No
showing was made that the particular appellants "were actually aware
86. Id at 263. See also Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 91 (1972).
87. North American Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908).
88. Coffin Bros. & Co. v. Bennett, 277 U.S. 29 (1928).
89. R. A. Holman & Co. v. SEC, 299 F.2d 127, 131 (D.C. Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
370 U.S. 911 (1962).
90. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944).
91. Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921).
92. See, e.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 92-93 (1972); Cedar Rapids
Eng'r. Co. v. Haenelt, 39 App. Div. 2d 275, 277 333 N.Y.S.2d 953, 956 (3rd Dep't 1972).
93. N.Y. Civ. PaAc. LAw § 7105 (McKinney Supp. 1972).
94. 407 U.S. at 94.
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or made aware of the significance of the fine print."9' 5 The language,
by its terms, did not waive the constitutional right to a hearing, but
merely acknowledged the right of repossession. Whether the reposses-
sion was ,to be by self-help, by final judgment in replevin or by pre-
judgment replevin (either with or without a hearing) was not
indicated.
While the dissenting opinion suggested that the effect of the de-
cision was minimal because creditors would merely alter their forms to
include clear waivers, 96 the availability and effectiveness of such waivers
in typical adhesion contracts is doubtful. The well-recognized presump-
tion against waiver of a constitutional right imposes a "heavy burden"
on creditors seeking to use the waiver argument in the replevin con-
text.97 A waiver of the constitutional right, to be effective, must have
been "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known
right or privilege," and there is a presumption against the waiver of
federal constitutional rights.98 The question whether a purported
waiver was both knowing and intentional may itself require prior hear-
ing for judicial determination.9
Nonetheless, waiver can be effective where the contract involved
is not one of adhesion (i.e. a form contract prepared by one of the
parties and not subject to negotiation), where the parties are equal
in bargaining power, and the waiver agreement is specifically nego-
tiated. These principles were applied in D. H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick
Co.-00 to uphold the waiver by a corporation of notice prior to entry
of judgment against it pursuant to a cognovit note. The agreement
was specifically negotiated, with both parties represented by counsel
who actively pursued the negotiations on this issue. It should be noted,
however, that while the successful, widespread use of waiver through
form contracts by commercial lending or selling institutions is highly
unlikely, limited consents on subjects such as the manner or timing of
notice of hearings may be recognized and accepted by the courts.101
95. Id. at 95.
96. Id. at 102.
97. Cedar Rapids Eng'r. Co. v. Haenelt, 39 App. Div. 2d 275, 277, 333 N.Y.S.2d
953, 956 (3d Dep't 1972).
98. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
99. Osmond v. Spence, 327 F. Supp. 1349, 1359 (D. Del. 1971), vacating and
remanding for further consideration, 405 U.S. 971 (1972).
100. 405 U.S. 174 (1972).
101. Without attempting to obtain a waiver of the basic rights to prior notice
and opportunity to be heard, the creditor may obtain significant consents in the loan
documents which could facilitate any subsequent replevin action. For example: (1) an
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IV. A PRACTICAL ALTERNATIVE: THE
ABANDONMENT OF PREJUDGMENT REPLEVIN
IN FAVOR OF POST-JUDGMENT REMEDIES
Enough has been said to indicate the impracticality of.present
replevin procedures where the items to be repossessed secure 'small
loans or have small value. With regard to such recoveries (and, in
many instances, on larger transactions as well), the creditor's attorney
will increasingly consider the feasibility of avoiding prejudgment s.eizure
altogether. Alternatives do exist which, if reinforced by statutory amend-
ment, could function effectively' as creditor remedies while preserving
full protection for the defendant's right to be heard and present any
defense. The existing procedures for post-judgment recovery,,have
cumbersome features, however, which make them singularly less effec-
tive in providing legal protection to the aggrieved creditor than should
be tolerated.
A. Final Judgment in Replevin Action
Because the time period required to give notice and to hold the
hearing preliminary to a prejudgment seizure is comparable to the
delay required to secure a final judgment in the replevin, action the
time advantage of seizure before 'judgment has been lost in any action
where judgment can be taken by default.10 2 Consequently, -the creditor
may choose to avoid prejudgment seizures altogether and'to proceed
directly to a final judgment in the replevin action. The final judgment
in the replevin action would be obtained by default due to the
nonappearance of the defendant in almost all instances. 0 3 Default
judgment now has to be entered by court order, rather than by action
of the clerk, inasmuch as the claim in the replevin complaint is 'not
"for a sum certain or for a sum which can by computation be made
agreement fixing the venue of the action (N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 501 (McKinney
Supp. 1972) ) ; (2) designation of an agent for the service of process ('id. R_ 318'*; (3)
consent to submission of the controversy to arbitration (id. § 7501) or pursuantzto the
Simplified Procedure for Court Determination of Disputes (id. §'§ 3031, 3033.>; (4)
consents to a specified manner of service on the debtor of any notice in connectioit with
a keplevin action and to adoption of that manner of service by court orderin any
subsequent action.
102. Compare the normal time period for service of notice '(see the discussion in
supra note 60) with normal answering periods of ten days (see. section 402- ofthe
UNIFORM CITY CT. ACT in N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW (McKinney Supp. 1972)) and twenty
days (see N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 3012 (McKinney Supp. 1972)).
103. Cf. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 92-93 n.29 (1972).
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certain.' 10 4 This is true even where the plaintiff waives any claim to
money damages for wrongful detention or the value of the property
and requests only a decree awarding possession. If damages are sought,
a hearing with testimony may be required, but judgment should be
readily available on affidavit application if only the award of the prop-
erty itself is at issue.10 5
While pursuing this remedy, the creditor will wish to protect his
security by enjoining its removal or destruction. In this effort, he will
face certain difficulties because the present statutoiy scheme contains
inconsistent provisions for injunctive relief. The former provisions
of the Civil Practice Act included authority for the issuance of an in-
junction to prevent a defendant from disposing of a chattel while it
remained in his possession prior to trial.106 The revisers omitted this
provision from the Civil Practice Law and Rules because the same
relief could be obtained by a combination of a temporary restraining
order and preliminary injunction 07 followed by a prejudgment seizure
of the chattel. According to article 63 of the CPLR, the issuance of an
injunction is justified only if action, or intended action, by a defendant
in detriment to the plaintiff's rights in the collateral can be shown.108
Moreover, the adequacy of alternate relief is always at issue, inasmuch
as the plaintiff can otherwise protect himself by resorting to prejudg-
ment seizure.109 There appears to be no general authority for the grant-
ing of an injunction to a creditor who wishes merely to proceed to final
judgment and not to rely on preliminary seizure.
104. N.Y. Crv. PRAac. LAW § 3215(a) (McKinney Supp. 1972).
105. Id. § 3215(b).
106. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1937, ch. 512, as amended by L. 1939, ch. 359 and L. 1952,
ch. 829. The section provided for discovery of the location of a chattel by court order
where the location was unknown to the plaintiff. If an undertaking was filed, the court
could include in the order a provision directing that the defendant not "remove from
the state, transfer, sell, pledge, assign or otherwise dispose of the said chattel or any
part thereof until the further order of the court or any judge thereof." The injunctive
relief, accordingly, was not available where there was no occasion to obtain a discovery
order.
107. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw §§ 6301 et seq. (McKinney Supp. 1972); Advisory
Committee Notes in 14 N.Y. STD. PRAC. SERv. 411 (1964).
108. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW §§ 6301 et seq. (McKinney Supp. 1972).
109. The Advisory Committee recommended the combination of a temporary
restraining order and seizure as adequate protection for the creditor in lieu of the
previous provision for contempt. (See 14 N.Y. STD. PLAC. SERv. 411 (1964).) Presently,
however, general equitable principles applicable under article 63 would seem to inhibit
or prevent altogether the issuance of a temporary injunction after location of the
chattel has been determined and the alternate remedy of seizure is found to be avail-
able to the creditor. A different result may requirea realignment of priorities by the
Legislature.
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New York's replevin procedure now provides injunctive relief
in the case of unique chattels, on the premise that the plaintiff in such
an instance is not fully protected by the availability of a money judg-
ment for the value of the goods. 10 However, recovery of a money judg-
ment for the value of unavailable collateral is small solace to the
creditor who already has the defaulted note or other contract obliga-
tion of the defendant. Waiver of the security and suit as a general
creditor would give him as much."'
The inconsistency was expanded in 1971 when, as a result of the
Laprease determination, the statute was amended by provisions which
granted power to the court to restrain removal, transfer or other dis-
position: (1) in the order of seizure, where authority for breaking, en-
tering and seizing the chattel was not granted to the sheriff" 2 and (2)
where, following prejudgment seizure of a chattel, it was returned to
the defendant without the requirement of a bond under a new hard-
ship procedure introduced into the statute at that time."8 If the policy
of the law is to permit the recovery of property by a defendant pend-
ing final judgment, with the protection of an injunction being substi-
tuted where seizure is not allowed, there is no reason to deny the same
protection to creditors who voluntarily refrain from making prejudg-
ment seizure applications.
An anomaly is created under the present state of the law, therefore.
On the one hand, routine seizure without notice or a hearing is no
longer permitted, and increased burdening of the courts with hearings
over the rights to prejudgment seizure of relatively valueless items are
and will be discouraged. On the other hand, however, injunctive re-
lief which would protect the creditor against the disposition of his col-
lateral before final judgment is available only if he seeks prejudgment
seizure in each instance.
The situation is further complicated by the fact that the statute
provides different remedies for seizure after judgment from before.
110. N.Y. Crv. PRAc. LAw § 7109(a) (McKinney Supp. 1972); Advisory Com-
mittee Notes in 14 N.Y. STD. Cv. PRAc. SERV. 409 (1964).
111. It should be noted that the benefits of a state judgment against a defendant
for the conversion of property liened to a creditor are largely eliminated by a recent
amendment to the Bankruptcy Act. Bankruptcy Act §§ 14(f), 17, 11 U.S.C. §§ 32(f),
35 (1971). Such judgments are not binding on the bankruptcy court and the entire
issue is subject to relitigation to determine whether the debtor has committed a willful
conversion, thereby excepting the creditor's claim for the value of the collateral from
the discharge provisions of the Act.
112. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 71D02(d) (McKinney Supp. 1972).
113. Id. § 7103(c). The section is set out in supra note 57.
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Seizure after judgment is by execution, with no express authority for
breaking into an enclosure to recover the chattel.114 The statute formerly
contained general authority for the sheriff to break and enter, which
applied to both his prejudgment seizure and to execution enforcement
of the replevin judgment.1 5 The post-Laprease amendment, however,
limited this power to situations where the order of seizure, issued for
prejudgment seizures only, contained this authority."10
The result is a patchwork replevin procedure which discourages
resort to final judgment remedies without in any way protecting the
legitimate concerns of debtors. Presumably, statutory amendment will
rectify the more obvious inequities. Meanwhile, however, reliance on
final judgment recovery, in lieu of the more time-consuming and ex-
pensive procedures for prejudgment seizure, may still be appropriate
where default is anticipated, and the danger of removal or damage to
the goods in the interim is considered minimal.
B. Action on the Debt
The replevin remedy has a more basic drawback for the creditor
seeking the shortest legal route to the maximum recovery. Against the
benefit of the relatively prompt seizure of the collateral through a pre-
judgment replevy in the event of anticipated defense by the party in
possession must be weighed the fact that replevin is a single purpose
remedy, limited to the recovery of a particular item of collateral rather
than the collection of the whole debt. The value of the collateral in
relation to the total balance of the indebtedness will largely determine
whether the chattel recovery effort is the main thrust of the creditor's
cause or merely a side-line distraction. Direct suit for recovery on the
debt may, in either event, be the least cumbersome and most direct
route to actual recovery of the collateral.
The judgment on the underlying indebtedness is enforceable by
execution, which can be levied on the goods held by the creditor as
collateral, as well as against other property of the debtor. A levy on
secured goods relates back in priority to the date of perfection of the
security interest, 17 rather than being governed by the rules of priority
114. Id. §§ 5102, 7108.
115. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1962, ch. 308, § 7110.
116. N.Y. Cry. PRAc. LAw § 7110 (McKinney Supp. 1972). The former version
of the section was captioned "Sheriff's powers to enter building on seizure or execu-
tion;" the amendment reduced the caption to read "Sheriff's powers" and limited all
reference to the prejudgment order of seizure stage of the action.
117. N.Y. U.C.C. § 9-501(5) (McKinney 1964).
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generally applicable to judgment levies. 118 Additionally, secured goods
which would normally be subject to exemption on judgment levies
are excluded from exemption "where the judgment is for the purchase
price of the exempt property.""19 A purchase money security interest
will, accordingly, be as readily enforceable through an action on the
debt as by a replevin action. In the absence of amendment of the
exemption section, however, property given as collateral security, rather
than as security for the repayment of its purchase price, will not be
recoverable by levy on the underlying debt if the property falls within
the provisions of the judgment exemption section. It is questionable
whether this is a desirable result. As long as such property may be
taken as security, the same power of enforcement ought to be available
in one action as in another, thereby encouraging legal economy and
reducing the burden of litigation before the courts, without reducing
the opportunity of the debtor to appear and defend against the claim
of default on his indebtedness.
Recovery of the collateral by levy under the judgment on the debt
is presently subject to the same limitations mentioned above with re-
spect to enforcement of the final judgment of replevin.120 Collection is
by execution. No provision is available for breaking and entering in
order to recover the collateral. Injunctive relief, pending judgment and
levy of the execution is subject to the same showing of actual damage
under section 6301 of the CPLR. But uncertainty is heightened be-
cause section 6301 requires a showing that the secured chattels are the
"subject of the action," and that the conduct of defendant tends "to
render the judgment ineffectual." Quite possibly these requirements
will not be met on the face of the pleadings, since the action is on the
general indebtedness rather than specifically on the right to the posses-
sion of the collateral.
CONCLUSION
The "blessing of age" has worn out on summary seizures in replevin
actions.12 1 In accepting the concept of increased consideration for
debtors and a jealous regard for their "opportunity to be heard," how-
ever, the courts and legislators should not lose sight of other relevant
considerations. Two of these should be noted:
118. N.Y. Cirv. PRAc. LAW § 5234 (McKinney 1963).
119. Id. § 5205(a) & (b).
120. See the text accompanying supra notes 103-16.
121. Laprease v. Raymours Furniture Co., 315 F. Supp. 716, 722-23 (N.D.N.Y.
1970,).
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1. The need continues for readily available credit to those who
have need to purchase the very necessaries and conveniences, the sum-
mary seizure of which the courts have so clearly disapproved, as well
as for the fulfilling of other needs and desires legitimate to any free
society.
2. That credit, to the extent it is founded on the security of
property, must reflect the cost of ultimate realization on the credit
and any losses resulting from the inability of the financer to do so.
The occasion for the discarding of the unsatisfactory features of
the replevin process may be an appropriate time for a fresh considera-
tion of this creditor remedial process. The amending process urged by
Governor Rockefeller 122 should have as its object the provision of legal
means for the efficient obtaining of information regarding the location
of secured chattels and their inexpensive recovery in a manner which
is considerate of the right of their possessor to present any defense to
the underlying claim or to the allegation of the secured interest. The
protection of this right, however, should not require unnecessary pro-
cedural encumbrances which add to the cost of legitimate collection
and the burden of increasing commercial litigation on the courts, with-
out thereby enhancing a defendant's rights to procedural due process.
Certain amendments seem clearly indicated, although the following
list is not presumed to be exhaustive.
1. Provision should be made for the granting of injunctive relief in
any action (whether for replevin or on the underlying debt) where
collateral security is claimed, to restrain the removal from the state of
any vehicle, aircraft or vessel or the removal from its location, or the
transfer, sale, pledge, assignment or other disposition of any other prop-
erty, pending the further order of the court. The relief should be
available with respect to all secured property, should be obtainable ex
parte either prior or subsequent to the commencement of the action
(but effective only on or subsequent to the service of the summons and
complaint) and should be subject to review by any judge of the court
which issued it after brief notice to the plaintiff, with provision for
scheduling of the review and notice to defendant by plaintiff's attorneys
on written demand from the defendant where the defendant is not
represented by counsel. Provisions for a fixed undertaking should be
included, with an undertaking in a lesser amount being obtainable for
cause shown, on prior notice to defendant.
122. Governor's Memo., N.Y. Sess. Law 1971, at 2640.
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2. The replevin provisions should specify standards for the granting
of ex parte seizure orders in extraordinary cases (where removal of the
chattel from the state or destruction or secretion of the chattel by the
defendant is shown to be about to occur), together with specification of
the requisite showing to be made, with opportunity for prompt review
after seizure and notice of the right of the defendant to appear and be
heard at the review, all to be served simultaneously with seizure.
3. The undertaking to be supplied on prejudgment replevin
seizure should be required only after issuance of the order of seizure,
with the bond form to be filed with and approved by the court clerk,
provided a corporate surety bond is used and the notice of application
includes the name of the bonding company and the amount of the
proposed bond. The court should be required to approve any bond
provided by other than a corporate surety. The bond for prejudgment
seizure could be the same bond previously given in connection with
injunctive relief, alone or in combination with any further security
required by the court.
4. Procedures should be specified for the prompt scheduling and
preferred handling of prejudgment seizure hearings. Issuance of the
seizure order by default and without proof should be authorized. An
actual hearing should be required only on service of written notice of
objections specifying the defenses urged for the hearing. The notice
should be served one day in advance of the return date, and the
testimony at the hearing should be limited to those issues. The burden
of responding with testimonial facts should be initially placed on the
defendant, ruling out mere general denials, with the ultimate burden
of showing the probable validity of his position on the creditor-plain-
tiff himself.
5. Section 7110 of the CPLR should be amended to provide for
authority to break, enter and seize upon preliminary seizure orders and
on the enforcement of final judgments in replevin or on the debt (the
authority being limited to seizure of secured property), with specifica-
tion of standards for the granting of the authority. For example, author-
ity should be granted in any final judgment or execution where the
court finds probable cause to believe the goods are on the specified
premises. Where household goods are involved, the standards should be
satisfied by statutory presumption, if the court finds probable cause to be-
lieve that the debtor's residence is as indicated and that the judgment
creditor has no reason to believe that the collateral is not still in the
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possession of the debtor. Plaintiff should be entitled to inclusion of
the authority in any case where notice of application therefor is in-
cluded in the procedural due process notice of the proposed prejudg,
ment seizure of collateral and no facts are thereafter presented by
defendant which would make the granting of such authority
inappropriate.
6. Any replevin judgment and any judgment on the debt, to the
extent of its enforcement for the recovery of a secured chattel where the
plaintiff is a secured creditor of the defendant, should be enforceable by
contempt (whether or not the chattel is unique).
7. Section 6205 of the CPLR should be amended to exclude from
the judgment exemption provisions any collateral over which a security
interest was granted to the judgment creditor by the judgment debtor,
provided it constituted collateral security for the judgment debt.
Regardless of whether such amendments are pursued by state
authorities, however, the creditor's attorney has an opportunity to exert
the creative legal function traditionally asserted by the bar when new
commercial needs required new legal remedies. Through carefully con-
sidered, narrowly drawn and fairly conceived private legal arrange-
ments, combined with judicious use of available legal remedies, recov-
ery of defaulted indebtedness may be enhanced and legal "red tape"
minimized within the limits imposed by the legislature, the courts and
general concepts of fair dealing. An enlightened creditor concern and
frank acceptance of society's legitimate interest in the protection of
the rights of the debtor must be recognized and fostered, at the same
time that protest is made against the predominant political tendency
to transmogrify all creditors by the worst practices of the least responsi-
ble members of the creditor community.
